In this paper relativistic ethical theories are handled in relation to intellectual property rights (IPRs). Different cultural traditions are a descriptive fact, and many such traditions-past and present-will be presented. It will be shown that the current Western versions of IPRs are offered as the only viable options in negotiations in international organisations such as the World Trade organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as well as in uni-, bi-and other multilateral negotiations by most Western countries. Free and open source software (FIOSS) and IPR systems similar to it are offered as a possibilities to respect the local traditions, although any local traditions are encouraged to be tried as options to the cultural homogenisation which the international treaties offer instead.
INTRODUCTION
First, relativism and its relationship-if any-to tolerance will be looked at. It will be shown that relativism per se does not promote tolerance, but since tolerance is an important value of liberal Western democracies and at least cultural relativism an established fact, it will be claimed that other IPR traditions should be given a chance to show whether they promote the good of mankind or not.
Intellectual creations make a post-industrial nation. If a nation has poor access to and poor levels of intellectual creativity in the form of immaterial creations, it is unlikely that the nation in question will rise even to an industrialized, let alone post-industrial level. There are many historical examples of how the access to immaterial creations has been handled by various strategies, ranging from a no-IPR policy, through government control of IPRs, to a policy of enforcing IPRs strongly within a country, but not respecting external IPRs (i.e., those in other countries) -In Western and other countries during their industrialization. Some of those will be examined in this paper. A surprising similarity can be found between the current IPR traditions of developing countries and those countries which have developed recently, with approaches that could be of benefit to the developing countries. Countries in similar situations to recently industrialized Western countries today include nations such as Brazil, China and other Second World countries that have been working on rising from the status of a Second World country to that of a First World country for some time. Third World countries generally do not have the infrastructure to fully exploit either a strong IPR policy or to benefit from the possibilities a no-IPR policy would grant them, if it was possible to establish such a policy. Even the poorest nations could benefit some, however, and could possibly enhance their best and brightest possibility to be included in the global society of immaterial creations.
Subsequently, the international treaties and organizations will be examined and their undoubted one-sidedness discussed. Finally, alternative possibilities to the system of IPRs promoted by Western countries will be considered. Some problems and possible future directions of IPRs are mapped in the concluding sections.
RELATIVISM
It is difficult to define what constitutes a culture. A typical first example would be a nation (state). Nations are not, however, homogenous groups but are constituted from various different groups which may interact with one another. Nor are cultures limited within national boundaries. The groups within and between nations can be native tribes, hacker communities, business leaders, university students, religious groups, etc. These groups do, however, typically share at least some values to some degree. Nonetheless, empirical facts from sociological and anthropological studies verify that different societies with different values exist. Empirical facts do not mean normative, ethical truths nor does tolerance necessarily emerge from acknowledging that different cultures have differing values. (See, e.g., Feldman, 1978; Pietarinen and Poutanen, 1997 or Weggert and Al-Saggaf, 2003, among many others.) Tolerance for different value sets has, however, been one of the most treasured Western values (based on the liberal tradition of the Western democracies). Different values are considered as enriching societies. It is strange how this does not seem to hold between societies when it comes to the values associated to immaterial creations. Tolerance should, however, be taken into account as an ethical way to function when designing IPR systems which are worldwide. It is known as a descriptive fact that various different traditions in regard to IPRs exist in different societies (Alford, 1995; Spinello, 1995; Chang, 2001a) . Why should others be not allowed to find their own ways when it comes to creating ways to handle IPRs? This of course does not mean that the Western societies ought to let other cultures dominate their thinking either. Nonetheless, if tolerance is a Western value, the Western societies should let other cultures define their ways of dealing with IPRs and respect that decision instead of forcing all societies to adopt the same IPR systems through organisations such as WTO and WIPO (TRIPS coming into effect even to the poorest nations in 2006, see Chang, 2001a) . In addition, the other systems could be examined: maybe something could be learned from the choices made. These decisions might actually aid the creation of intellectual woks in Western societies as well.
Even if relativistic moral theory is accepted, moral utterances of other groups or societies can be critiqued (Pietarinen and Poutanen, 1997) . In relativistic moral thinking (be it conventionalism or cultural relativism) values are thought to come from the values of the group with which the values are shared (Feldman, 1978) . Thus the values are not objective nor are they claimed to be right for those belonging to other groups. Other groups should not be forced to share the views of the first through international treaties or pressure by uni-or bilateral negotiations, but rather by convincing them that the expressed moral opinions are true even on the basis of their own moral premises.
Western societies are participating in cultural imperialism when forcing their own IPR systems onto other countries. As Weckert and Al-Saggaf (2003) put it: "A culture might dominate, not because it is 'better' as a culture, but because it is the culture of a group who are economically and militarily strong." This does not mean that cultures with lesser or more free IPRs would be morally wrong in their attitudes towards immaterial creations even if the differing view would not necessarily survive the 'fight' between different views on IPR laws. They might still promote a better and more ethical way to treat the users and even the creators of the immaterial than the Westem-promoted ones do.
Freedom of choice in how the IPR laws are made should be the norm instead of the exception. Now the various IPR legislations are forced in place by bilateral (or rather unilateral) negotiations by the stronger (See, e.g., Alford, 1995 on how China (both continental and Taiwan) has been treated). If we are worried about being ethical, cultural imperialism "cannot be defended simply on the grounds of 'survival of the fittest'" (Weckert and AlSaggaf, 2003) .
Different interpretations of IPRs should be respected. This would be both tolerant and respecting others' views about the way they want to build their societies. Some societies, such as that of China, have had a culture in which plagiarism is seen as the (sometimes only) way to give credit for a worthy thought (Alford, 1995) . Other societies, often native ones, see the societal ownership of immaterial creations as being the right way (Shiva, 2003) .
HISTORY
Until very recently, the idea behind IPRs in the Western societies has also been to promote the advancement of the societies. Examples of this are the recent practices of the patent applications of "first to file" instead of "first to invent". The Western societies have copied intellectual capital such as the technologies of printing, paper, powder, etc. from various other cultures. The result has often been that the IPRs have been claimed by those who introduced the technologies in the countries to which they were copied, instead of by the inventor in the countries where they were created. As Chang (2001a) puts it: "patenting of imported inventions by their nationals was often explicitly allowed" (emphasis in original). Nor have the inventions been introduced to public domain in the society to which they were introduced, were the original inventors or their descendants not eligible for the protection any more.
Throughout history, countries in the process of industrialization have tried their best to ignore at least any foreign IPRs (see, e.g., Alford, 1995 or Drahos, 1996 . Originally patent rights were not given to IPR creators in UK (and elsewhere in Europe, see Chang 2001a), but rather to anyone who brought forth new inventions in the country. A similar situation prevailed in the US regarding copyrights (as foreign copyrights were not acknowledged), until the US was no longer a net benefactor of copyright (foreign copyrighted materials did not receive, even formally let alone in reality, protection in US until 1891) (Alford, 1995; Chang, 2001a and 2001b) . At the same time, however, the US was strongly driving for stronger international patent rights (Chang, 2001b) . Many Western countries either did not have effective IPR laws during large parts of the years of their industrialization (e.g., Netherlands and Switzerland, which for a long period had no patent laws at all) or did not respect at least foreign IPRs (for a more detailed description see Chang 2001a). Japan after the Second World War did not enforce strong IPRs until its own rate of IPR creation rose to a level similar to that in other industrialized nations, turning it into a net benefactor in granting IPRs (See, e.g., Pirages, 1996 , or Chang, 2001 .
In these examples of Western countries and their attitudes to IPRs throughout history, IPRs were not granted to foreigners or even to nationals of the countries themselves or were considerably shorter in duration and more narrow in scope (see, e.g., Spinello, 1995 or Lessig, 2001 ) in the field they protected, for the specific reason that this benefited the society at that time. Such examples show that the moral (and economic) grounds for IPRs can and do change over time. In US, the original term of copyright was 14 years, renewable once for another 14 years. This was changed in 1831 to 28 years, once renewable for another 14 years and so forth until in the Bono Copyright Extension Act it was lengthened to the lifetime of the creator plus 70 years (for a more detailed description, see Henderson, 2003) .
It would be absurd to claim that, were Japan, Taiwan or South Korea still Third or Second World countries, this would be better for the rest of the world, let alone for the people living there. One of the reasons this is not the case, is that, well before the aggressive bilateral negotiations started in the early 80s, these countries were able to use the intellectual capital created in the more-industrialized countries (Granstrand, 1999; Chang, 200 1 a) . They were able to establish their own production of cars, electronics, clothing etc. by performing what could be called industrial espionage in Western factories and searching through filed patents in patent offices, building their own factories, producing similar products and then excelling in many of the fields to get on par with and then overtake the American or European producers.
Today, IPRs cannot be copied similarly due to the emergence of the postindustrial era, Most of the actual useful material is not in the form of factories or machines anymore. Now it is in the form of immaterial creations; software, inventions, and chips which cannot be copied just by looking at them, as well as digitally distributable material. It is especially difficult to copy the way software works since only the object code is released in commercial creations. We are already seeing problems with countries such as China which are trying to reach the industrial state of Western countries-with factory conditions reminding us of the industrialization of UK -industrialization causing both local and global pollution, with much of the benefits flowing to Western capital owners instead of benefiting the local economy etc. It might be possible to bypass some of that industrialization in at least the Third World countries (if not in China or India anymore). This would consume fewer natural resources, since it would lead straight into the post-industrial situation where intellectual capital could be more valuable to all societies combined and use less resources needed industrial production like oil through enhanced products and at least partly bypass industrialization. This would also benefit the Western world in polluting less, creating less global warming and other nonbeneficial effects in the world and yet raise the living standard of people living in these countries. It would create a situation of raw-material production (which already exists in developing countries) combined with post-industrial and some industrial production.
4.

OTHER SOLUTIONS TO THE IMMATERIAL
Until recently, countries such as Brazil (see, e.g., Stallman, 2004 on how Brazil still seeks measures for curing the digital divide through using F/OSS and how the US voted against including such solutions in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)), China and other Second World countries have tried to oppose the enforcement of foreign IPRs. This was partly a result of their own national histories in regard to IPRs and of course because they consider acknowledging foreign IPRs as being detrimental to their own development. This holds even more true for Third World countries, which have virtually no IPRs of their own, yet are expected to follow international treaties supporting the existing IPRs of industrialized and post-industrial countries.
Many societies, especially in the developing countries, see the need to spread new innovations in the society as being more important than granting IPRs (Steidlmeier, 1993; Spinello, 1995) . Malaysia, for example, still sees the good of the society important enough to override IPR holders' rights to software in some situations, such as for educational use in schools or for encouraging computer use in general. They have as recently as 2002, considered letting pirated software to be used in schools and social organizations. (Weckert and Al-Saggaf, 2003 ) As Weckert and Al-Saggaf put it: "This suggests a quite different view of the importance of intellectual property." Intellectual property is not considered as valuable as other goals in society. The learning to use and create immaterial products is considered to be, at least in these cases of a higher value.
A recent example of non-Western countries wishing not to have the international Western-type IPRs applied universally and questioning the idea of strong IPRs resulting to strong development can be found in the motion proposal tabled at WIPO by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Venezuela (WIPO, 2005) . This "Group of Friends of Development" called for "promoting development and access to knowledge for all" exactly in the form of lesser and more localized IPR laws. Contemporary examples would include plant patents for which the knowledge is often considered the socially owned intellectual capital of a tribe. After being introduced in pharmaceutical form, even the tribe's members, who often are at best paid baubles for the information, must pay to use it even though they were the original inventors of the information (on 'biopiratism', see e.g., George, 2003 or Shiva, 2003 . The current international IPR treaties which the countries in which this happens have been forced to accept do not take into account communal ownership of knowledge. Nor could it be taken into account in a fair way due to the imbalance of the negotiation situation even if the communal patent or communal copyright were introduced. The situation is in a way very similar and yet the opposite of the former introducing of an invention. It is similar in the sense that it allows the one who introduces the invention to use it (and even excludes the original inventors). It is the opposite in the sense that it now applies also to the country from which the knowledge was gathered. Now that the exploiter is a beneficiary also in the country which is being robbed of its intellectual capital, the introducer can gain even wider access to IPRs which even now should belong to others.
An analogy with the HIVIAIDS cures in South Africa illustrates the situation. Western societies have ensured (to varying, but mainly functional, degrees) that their citizens have access to HIVIAIDS cures, but intellectual property rights have (in part) seen to it that nations with lesser capabilities to purchase IPR protected medicines have few alternatives. Counter to treaties in IPRs (TRIPS, George, 2003) signed by the South African government, South Africa none the less decided not to pay licensing fees to Western pharmacy companies if they didn't lower the prices of the medicines to a more acceptable level, which they then did. Drug production in various other countries such as India or Brazil also breaks these IPR treaties. Many of the drugs used in South Africa are imported fiom these countries. Even though some of the medicines produced in these countries end up in the markets of industrialized countries, the amount is negligible compared to the potential rises of up to 99% in the prices of the medicines (see, e.g., IPS, 2004).
The same is apparent in access to information. Those with fewer resources have less access to information but are expected to follow the rules of the "haves". This results in a situation where the advances gained by the "haves" do not benefit the "have-nots" even in the long run as is claimed by those subscribing to the 'trickle down theory' of the benefits eventually reaching the poor as well (see Kimppa, 2004a for a more thorough handling of the issue).
The percentages of so-called software piracy (another very loaded word) in countries which have or have had lesser or no IPRs in place and among population groups such as students (notably having less income than many other groups of the society) promotes the thought that maybe there is something wrong with our IPRs rather than with the people they drive to use 'pirated' software. A more moderate approach in IPRs might well propel the economies of developing countries to rise.
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
To the best of their ability, organizations such as WTO (through TRIPS), international monetary fund (IMF) and WIPO have tried to fight for the privileges of the IPR holders. WTO and IMF for example are strongly promoting the neo-liberal thinking which has as one of its main components strong IPR legislation as global solution to the problems of the Third World (Chossudovsky; , for the problems of justifying IPRs based on the liberal tradition, see Kimppa, 2004b Kimppa, , 2005a Kimppa, and 2005b . It does not seem that these organizations are be interested in the rights of the creator of the immaterial, nor of the user of immaterial creations, but rather in the interests of the organizations that hold and distribute the immaterial and the interests of the countries which create most of the immaterial at the moment (against those who do not have IPRs).
The strengthening, lengthening and enlarging of the area of protection of IPRs benefits the industry, but does not enlarge the distribution of the products. It protects the IPR owners' rights instead of the IPR creators' rights. For the creators, the wider distribution which shorter IPRs would enable, could in many cases be of more benefit than the longer protection. The software business in any case hardly ever grants any rights to the creator of the immaterial but rather they are transferred directly to the employer. This leads to a one-sided view, which hardly can be called socially responsible in the global scale. The rights of the people of the countries which do not hold immaterial creations and rights in large amounts are not taken into account. The rights of these people to do with as they please with their material based on that immaterial is strictly limited due to them not being able to use the immaterial to improve their situation. In a Lockean liberal sense, this would seem wrong (Kimppa, 2005a) . Also, the consequences of this kind of politics seems to strengthen the current divide in the prosperity that would be available (Kimppa, 2004a and Kimppa, 2005b) . Finally, the ethical aspect of relying on laws and regulations in a situation which would rather call for ethical behaviour in the part of the potential users and respecting their rights seems to be forgotten (Kimppa, 2005b) .
It should be noted that the 'democracy' of WTO (where, it is claimed, all the countries are in similar situation when each has a vote), is subverted by the fact that the numbers of lobbyists from the industrialized countries seems to be equal or even exceeds the amount of country representatives, while 40 countries either do not even have one regular representative or share a representative with another country (George, 2003) . If the negotiation situation would be more equal, we might be able to find a globally acceptable solution to IPRs, although, owing to different values in different societies, even that is doubtful.
The situation is similar within WIPO. Lessig (2001) provides us with an example on how the lobbying in these organizations works:
"It is an iron law of modem democracy [which WIPO and WTO theoretically are!] that when you create a regulator, you create a target for influence, and when you create a target for influence, those in the best position to influence will train their efforts upon that target." "Thus, commercial broadcasters-NBC and CBS in particular-were effective in getting the government to allocate spectrum according to their view of how spectrum should be used. (This was helped by the broadcasters' practice of offering free airtime to members of Congress.)" (Lessig, 2001.) It seems, thus, that expecting the current Second and Third World countries to respect the IPRs of the industrialized and post-industrial nations is only a way to keep the status quo by limiting the possibilities of these countries to climb to an equal level in the world. This might-in the short run-be beneficial to certain groups in the Western world. But even for the Western world it is clearly not beneficial in the long run. For who would seriously think anyone better off if, for example, Japan, Taiwan or South Korea had been held back from using the Western IPRs during their (re)industrialization after the Second World War? This does not even begin to consider all the negative aspects this kind of development holds for the currently industrializing or Third World countries.
ALTERNATIVE WAYS
To a large degree, the Eastern and other Second World IPR creators in the software business now sell their creativity to IPR holders in Western societies. Through this practice they are not helping their own societies nearly as much as they could if the creations and their profits stayed in their own societies. The situation is similar to that in tourism development where a company brings all the materials and even workers to construct and operate a holiday resort from abroad and then also takes all the profits back abroad. The local economy hardly sees a difference except in its resources being exploited.
There is a similar trend with the creation of software and other digitally distributable material (DDM) as well. In the FIOSS movement the situation would be different. If local programmers create software-and luckily they a r e f o r FIOSS instead of for the proprietary software companies, even local software can be used anywhere. Any local software can be modified to benefit any society or social group, whether the software is made in India or in Finland. This is clearly not true for the proprietary software in the same amounts as it is true for FIOSS.
If all software would function as FIOSS we would not have this problem, for all software-or other DDM for the matter-could be used to benefit the local needs and wants instead of the large corporations and their shareholders it is benefiting now. Unfortunately for this kind of creativity, the various forms of digital millennium copyright act (DMCA, 1998; European Copyright Directive, 2001 ) and software patents are trying to stifle this as are the lengthening and strengthening of IPRs in other ways. This is also why the ideological basis behind FIOSS and especially FSS (Free Source Software) is more important than it first appears. This is why we should try to encourage ideological thinking about software creation and DDM creation instead of just plain practical thinking. If we are not ideological, we do not care about the good of the people but only about what happens to be good for us right now, and this can hardly be considered as being much more ethical than the thinking of proprietary companies in which the only aim is to increase the shareholder value. This kind of behaviour cannot in good conscience be considered socially responsible.
Just releasing constraints on IPRs will of course not bring about the change for better. Other measures, including some which are actually being taken at the moment (such as forgiving the debts of at least the poorest Third World countries) must be taken. Unfortunately that does not help the Second World countries, nor does it help countries to bypass the industrialization stage.
Other measures must be taken as well if we want to improve the situation in the long run -one of which would be to release all restrictions on using IPRs by the poorest countries.
Even though the no-IPR policy might produce the best results, whatever method is chosen by the countries should be respected. This is true, whether the chosen way is to adopt an IPR policy similar to the current Western one, or rather one that resembles the way countries that are currently postindustrial treated other countries' IPRs during their industrialization, or the no-IPR policy suggested here.
CONCLUSION
Most countries either did not have strong internal IPRs nor did they exhibit much respect for international IPRs during their industrialization. The European countries and US were in the first wave of such IPR behaviour. The second wave included the East Asian 'new tigers', such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, refining the practices the previous industrializing countries used. (Chang, 2001a) The current situation differs from both of these. Copying production methods and processes has become ever harder in general, due to their complexity and, in software in particular, due to the object code being released but the source code being held as a trade secret. Fortunately, the use of digitally distributable material (DDM), be it software or anything else, is easy.
If treaties such as TRIPS were not forced on Third World countries, this could be used to the advantage of developing countries in many ways. Some of these, like the IPR policy adopted in Iran, would closely follow the practice of previous times where internal IPRs were enforced but external ones where generally ignored. Others would surely adapt ways closer to the ideas in practice in countries like Malaysia, where the social good is considered more important, and thus the usage of IPR protected material at least in selected parts of the society could be free.
Why would software and DDM specifically be of benefit to the development of immaterial creations in Second and Third World countries? The copying of such materials is the easiest form of copying-any DDM can be copied and recopied if it is not specifically obstructed by digital rights management software. On top of this, we have a thriving FIOSS culture which is already doing things similar to what is suggested in this paper. The FIOSS movement could offer some ways to handle IPRs in these new situations.
The concept of being paid for work done, instead of being granted rights to the intellectual material could be taken up. This would produce local jobs enhancing and implementing software and creating other digitally distributable material. The way to support this kind of action should be through proving that it would work rather than forcing the developing societies to accept any particular way of using and creating their own immaterial creations.
A moratorium on the enforcement of the IPRs of the industrialized countries would be one of the necessary steps for the Third World to be able to catch up with the industrialized countries while by-passing some of the problems inherent in industrialization. During the moratorium, an analytical discussion should be conducted to determine which would be the best way for the developing country to move towards IPRs, whether it would be the current one-for-all system proposed through the WTO, or whether it would be something different depending on the needs of the given society. Honouring the IPR systems others choose to implement would be ethical, tolerant and socially responsible in helping the developing countries to develop their own immaterial creations.
